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Glossary 
Basel Accords refer to international agreements on banking regulations supervised by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The Committee’s Secretariat is based in 
Basel, Switzerland. The BCBS has representation from major countries, including the UK. 
Basel Accords are a series of recommendations on banking supervision, such as Basel I, II and 
III. Basel III mostly supersedes the previous accords and sets out rules on banking capital and 
liquidity. The key idea is to enhance the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks and 
improve risk management. 
Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are financial products created by banks and resold to 
investors. These generally pool, or repackage, a variety of cash flow generating assets on a 
bank’s books. The assets could be a variety of loans, mortgages, company bonds and credit 
card debt that require repayments. The mix of the repackaging creates different degrees of 
risks and thus tries to appeal to the risk preferences of investors. They are ‘collateralised’ 
because the promised payments of the variety of debts in the package provide the collateral, 
which gives the debt its value. Banks like CDOs because they enable them to raise cash flow 
and give out more loans, and also shift the risk of default from the banks to the investors 
holding the CDOs.  
Derivative has been defined by the US Treasury as “a financial contract whose value is 
derived from the performance of underlying market factors, such as interest rates, currency 
exchange rates, and commodity, credit, and equity prices. Derivative transactions include an 
assortment of financial contracts, including structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, 
futures, options, caps, floors, collars, forwards, and various combinations thereof”¹. 
Derivatives have a notional or face value. This is the total value of the asset, at the current 
market (spot) price, against which a contract is written.  
Leverage ratio relates to a company’s method of financing its operations and generally 
indicates its ability to meet financial obligations or absorb shocks. The leverage ratios can be 
calculated in many ways. One example looks at the gross leverage ratio which highlights the 
extent to which a company’s total assets are financed by long-term capital provided by 
shareholders equity. So, if a company has assets of £100 million and shareholders have 
provided capital of £10 million then the leverage ratio is 10%. The question then is whether 
the £10 million of capital is sufficient to absorb shocks arising from bad debts and poor 
investments. If not, then after the exhaustion of £10 million, the company will technically be 
bankrupt. 
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Executive summary 
Six years after the 2008 banking crash, there have been some small tweaks, but little 
structural reform of the financial sector and nothing has been done to deal with the 
fundamental causes of the financial crisis. Organised gambling and anti-social 
practices by the banks undermined the stability of the entire economy, yet to all 
intents and purposes it remains business as usual for the financial elite. The state, 
most notably the US, has occasionally bitten back, but fines have just become another 
cost of doing business. Rear-guard action by financial elites to protect the selfish 
games of the banking sector has resulted in only paltry changes to regulation.  
Neoliberalism, the dominant ideology since the 1970s, focuses on deregulation and 
the endless pursuit of private wealth. The corrosive effects of neoliberalist values 
have been most evident in the financial sector, where profits have been made from 
selling abusive financial products, money laundering, tax avoidance, sanction busting, 
speculation on commodities and land, takeovers and insider trading. There are no 
constraints on speculative activities and financiers routinely gamble ordinary people’s 
savings and pensions on an unprecedented scale. This reckless gambling produces 
little, if any, real additional wealth, but its destructive effects have had serious 
consequences for the average household and the wider economy. 
It is hard to find any major bank that did not seek to fill its coffers by abusive 
practices. When the crash landed, banks like Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, 
HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland faced a liquidity crisis and the state stepped in to 
rescue them, pouring in billions to support the ailing industry. Neoliberalism has 
created perverse incentives for distortions in the financial sector where profits are 
privatised and losses are socialised. Contrary to neoliberal claims, the state has not 
been rolled-back, but instead has been absolutely central to the survival of the 
financial sector. The state has been restructured to support the corporate sector, and 
guarantee profits. It has bailed out banks and shielded them from public scrutiny. The 
state, rather than the market, has committed loans and guarantees of £977 billion² to 
support distressed banks; and under Quantitative Easing, the Bank of England has 
given £375 billion³, about £16,000 per household to the banks. While ‘nationalisation’ 
has not been mentioned, the effects on the public purse are the same.  
4 Banking in the public interest - Prem Sikka 
The financial sector has colonised the state in such a way that political power has 
been subordinated to corporate interests. Through their capture of the state, 
neoliberals have diluted, if not eliminated, the risk of business bankruptcy in the 
financial sector. For decades, the sector has been engaged in a series of 
malpractices, but has been bailed out. Its executives have inflicted enormous social 
harms through engaging in anti-social practices, but continue to collect massive 
remuneration packages. There is an urgent need for reforms that check the worst 
excesses of neoliberalism by strengthening democratic control and accountability in 
the banking sector.  
This paper suggests a number of reforms: 
1. Separate retail and speculative banking 
2. Legislate for approval to be sought before investment banking can be 
financed with public funds 
3. Restrict access to public courts for financial corporations 
4. Introduce a financial transactions tax 
5. Break the link between regulators and industry insiders 
6. Emphasise public interest over market pressures 
7. Publicise remuneration contracts 
8. Make banks a central part of the community 
9. Ensure greater transparency 
10. Make tax returns public in order to tackle tax avoidance 
11. End private auditing  
12. Ensure regular reviews of the banking industry 
On their own, they will not solve the deep-seated crisis in our financial sector, but 
they will provide an important starting point for long-term reform. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Historically, liberalism has been a mixed bag of ideas from the left and the right of 
the political spectrum. It encompassed progressive thinkers such as William 
Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes who envisaged constraints on the movement of 
capital and a key role for the state in redistributing wealth to create a more equitable 
and just society. However, since the 1970s, under the influence of writers such as 
Milton Freedman and Friedrich August von Hayek, liberalism has been rapidly 
displaced by neoliberalism. The neo or newer elements in this philosophy promote 
faith in free markets, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, mobility of capital and 
forms of regulation which emphasise light-touch regulation for financial markets and 
erosion of labour rights. The state, neoliberals argued, had to be rolled-back because 
it was inefficient and got in the way of self-correcting markets. Neoliberalism not 
only informed the economic and social policies of governments, but also provided 
everyday understandings of what it means to be successful. It reconstructed 
individuals as competitive beings engaged in the endless pursuit of private wealth 
and consumption, which would somehow lead to vast increases in new jobs, 
efficiency, affluence and happiness. Such ideologies were eagerly embraced by 
governments in the UK and USA and exported to other countries through foreign 
direct investment, trade agreements and financial institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.  
A necessary condition for the operation of markets that work in the interest of 
society is that individuals need to be constrained in some way by social norms and 
regulatory structures. Such constraints induce stability, predictability and a sense of 
fairness that is so essential for any social system to work. This sense of social 
cohesiveness has been undermined by individualisation promoted by neoliberalism. 
The individualisation of society has created opportunities for making a fast buck with 
very few repercussions for deviant behaviour. Bending the rules for personal gain is 
often regarded as a sign of business acumen or as stealing a march on a competitor, 
rather than acting in a criminal way. Almost any trick is considered to be acceptable if 
it leads to personal enrichment.  
The danger signs were evident well before the 2008 financial crash. A UK government 
investigation into share price rigging in 1997 concluded that too many executives at 
major corporations have a "cynical disregard of laws and regulations ... cavalier 
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misuse of company monies ... contempt for truth and common honesty. All these in a 
part of the City [of London] which was thought respectable”⁴. Still, governments 
even more vigorously promoted neoliberalism by allowing banks to gamble without 
any limits.  
Prior to the Financial Services Act 1986, gambling debts were generally not 
enforceable in courts, but the government slipped in an amendment “that for the 
first time ever said that the gaming laws of the land would not apply to these City 
gaming contracts”⁵. The financial sector made vast profits from speculation on the 
price of wheat, housing, corn, copper, gas, electricity, mortgages, currencies and 
anything else that could be priced. The light-touch regulatory regime overseen by 
the grandees of the finance industry did nothing to stop the circus of speculation, 
mostly with other people’s monies.  
The move away from traditional banking to speculative banking changed the nature 
of banks. In 1969, retail deposits accounted for 88% of bank liabilities but by 2009, 
they stood at just 40%⁶, and indicated that banks have moved away from their 
traditional role and become firmly embedded in speculative practices. On the back 
of unrestrained gambling and merger mania, banks became too big and perhaps too 
important to fail. Of course, organisations can go bankrupt, but because banking 
operations are intertwined with the rest of the economy, politicians felt that the 
sector could not be permitted to collapse. The too-important-to-fail syndrome 
meant that banks no longer cared about the social consequences or even their own 
survival, as the cost of failures would be picked up by someone else. Some people 
made vast amounts of money, but it all tumbled down with the financial crash of 
2007-2008 and inflicted hardship upon millions of people.  
 
Chapter 2: The impact of neoliberal 
culture on the finance sector  
The corrosive effects of neoliberalist values have been most evident in the financial 
sector, a champion of deregulation and free markets. It has made huge profits from 
money laundering, tax avoidance, sanction busting, speculation on the price of 
commodities and insider trading. In an environment of poor regulation, the mid-
1970s secondary banking crash spread to insurance, property and other sectors. The 
government bailed out companies and had to negotiate a loan from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In subsequent decades, the financial sector sold predatory 
financial products relating to pensions, endowment mortgages, precipice bonds, split 
capital investment trusts and payment protection insurance. These products were 
designed and marketed by executives whose remuneration was linked to profits. 
Staff were trained to sell them to unsuspecting customers, with the promise of 
higher financial rewards. Markets lauded companies for their high profits and 
dividends, but did not ask any questions about the quality of profits. Regulators 
simply looked on. Despite having a plethora of non-executive directors, audit 
committees, ethics committees and eminent accounting firms as auditors, there was 
no disclosure of any of the shady practices.  
In 1984, Johnson Matthey Bank collapsed under the weight of fraud and the Bank of 
England organised a rescue. In 1995, Barings Bank collapsed due to fraud. The 
twentieth century’s biggest banking frauds took place at the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI). In July 1991, the Bank of England closed BCCI. Some 
1.4 million depositors lost some part of their savings. However, unlike the previous 
banking collapses, no government inspectors have been appointed to investigate the 
BCCI frauds. A US Senate investigation into the frauds at BCCI concluded that British 
regulators and bank auditors had become “partners, not in crime, but in cover up”⁷. 
In 1992, Lord Justice Bingham⁸ was asked to examine the failure of the Bank of 
England to effectively supervise BCCI operations, but his report has not been 
published in full⁹ as successive governments sought to protect the identity of key 
players. After a freedom of information dispute lasting five and a half years, in 2011, 
the courts ordered¹⁰ the UK government to release one secret report, codenamed 
the Sandstorm Report¹¹, on BCCI frauds which names the parties looting the bank. 
HM Treasury website still does not show this document. 
The mid-1970s banking crash showed that banks must have adequate capital to 
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absorb shocks caused by market volatility and investments going sour. As a banking 
crash can bring the whole economy down, it is vital that external regulators 
scrutinise the bank’s own assessment of risks and determine the capital that is 
needed. However, that is not what happened in the run-up to the 2008 financial 
crash. Following the Basel II accord (see glossary), from 2004 onwards, regulators 
decided to rely on risk assessment models developed by banks themselves with the 
help of credit rating agencies. These were based on numerous assumptions about 
market prices and the presence of buyers and sellers, and could not easily be 
verified. Nevertheless, banks were permitted to move large amounts of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) off their balance sheets (see glossary). More 
than $5,000 billion (£3.125 billion) of assets and liabilities were not reported in bank 
balance sheets¹². Some $1.2 trillion (£750 billion) of bad debts and toxic assets were 
shown as good assets by banks¹³. This should have been a cue for auditors to raise 
red flags, but they did not. Almost all distressed banks received the customary clean 
bill of health from their auditors¹⁴ even though at one stage, the UK’s Chancellor of 
the Exchequer felt the country was just two hours away from a financial meltdown¹⁵.   
Banks had little idea of their overall risks, assets and debts, but the financial 
engineering described above allowed them to show artificially high amounts of 
capital in their balance sheets. Stock markets wanted a slice of that in the form of 
higher dividends. In 2007, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) gave Northern Rock 
a waiver from the Basel II requirements. A subsequent hearing by the UK House of 
Commons Treasury committee noted¹⁶ that “due to this approval, Northern Rock felt 
able to announce on 25 July 2007 an increase in its interim dividend¹⁷ of 30.3%. This 
was because the waiver and other asset realisations meant that Northern Rock had 
an anticipated regulatory capital surplus over the next 3 to 4 years”. Within days, 
Northern Rock faced a cash flow crisis as the market for mortgage-backed securities 
collapsed, and it could not continue to repackage the mortgages and sell them 
immediately to raise cash. Anxious savers formed queues outside branches to 
retrieve their savings and the UK faced its first bank run since 1866. The neoliberal 
state rescued and, subsequently, nationalised the bank. This was followed by the 
nationalisation of Bradford & Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and the state-
sponsored rescue of HBOS by Lloyds amongst others. The state also poured in 
billions to support the ailing financial sector.  
Banks must have adequate capital to meet any shocks, but under the weight of 
corporate power, regulators continue to be persuaded that this needs to be as small 
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as possible. Just before the crash, Bear Stearns had some $11 billion (£6.9 billion) in 
equity and $395 billion (£247 billion) of assets, most of which could not easily be 
turned into cash to meet its obligations¹⁸. The bank had a leverage ratio of over 35 to 
1 ($395 billion/$11 billion) and could barely absorb a decline of around 3% in its 
assets. Lehman Brothers had a leverage ratio of more than 30 to 1¹⁹. With this 
leverage, a 3.3% drop in the value of assets would wipe out the entire value of equity 
and make the bank technically insolvent. RBS had an even lower leverage ratio of just 
2%. Rather than requiring banks to restrain executive pay and dividends to build their 
capital base, the latest Basel accord requires them to have a leverage ratio of only 3%
²⁰. Despite the crash, regulators continue to trust banks’ own risk-assessment 
models, which have already failed. Lloyds Banking Group claims to have some £143 
billion of high quality mortgages on its books and in accordance with the current 
rules, it holds just £314 million of capital to cover the specific risks²².  This means that 
Lloyds has lent some 455 times the capital earmarked to absorb the losses. It would 
only take a default rate of 0.2% for the entire capital of £314 million to be wiped out. 
Taking advantage of lax regulation and enforcement 
In pursuit of higher corporate profits and performance-related remuneration, banks 
have scaled new heights in predatory practices. For example: 
 RBS and Société Générale, JP Morgan and Citigroup have been fined €1.71 
billion (£.142 billion) for participating in illegal cartels²² in markets for financial 
derivatives by fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). 
 UBS has agreed to pay $1.5 billion (£940 million) to US, UK and Swiss 
regulators for attempting to manipulate the LIBOR interbank lending rate²³. 
 Following a $187 billion bailout of mortgage guarantee firms Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the US Federal Housing Finance Agency has sued a number of 
banks for making misleading statements relating to the sale of around $200 
billion in mortgage-backed securities. In February 2014, Morgan Stanley 
settled by agreeing to pay $1.25 billion²⁴ (£765.5 million). Previously, JP 
Morgan Chase paid $13 billion (£8.1 billion)²⁵ and Deutsche Bank paid $1.925 
billion (£1.2 billion)²⁶ to settle the charges. A number of other banks, including 
Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and RBS, have 
also been sued²⁷. 
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 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has fined Goldman Sachs 
$550 million (£344 million) for misleading investors in a subprime mortgage 
product²⁸. 
 In July 2013, the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission fined Barclays 
Bank $470 million (£294 million)²⁹ for the manipulation of electricity prices by 
its derivative traders. 
 The Lloyds Banking Group was fined over £28 million for promoting a culture 
of selling abusive financial products³⁰. 
 HSBC was fined $1.9 billion (£1.19 billion) for facilitating money laundering by 
terrorists and drug kingpins³¹. 
 Standard Chartered paid a fine of over $300 million (£188 million) for money 
laundering and sanction busting³². 
 The European Union is investigating the Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, 
Barclays, Bear Stearns (now part of JP Morgan), BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, 
UBS and RBS for possible abuses in price fixing of Credit Default Swaps (CDS)³³. 
 A former Goldman Sachs director has been found guilty³⁴ of providing insider 
information to a hedge fund manager. 
The above examples are the tip of the iceberg, and provide a glimpse of malpractices 
carefully manufactured in banking boardrooms by smart, wealthy and highly 
educated individuals. 
Large-scale tax avoidance 
Tax avoidance has been added to the financial sectors’ portfolio of deviant practices: 
 A US Senate Committee³⁵ reported that Deutsche Bank, HVB, UBS, and 
NatWest colluded with major accountancy firms to construct orchestrated 
transactions to enable their wealthy clients to avoid taxes. 
 In February 2009, the US Department levied a fine of $780 million (£488 
billion) on UBS to settle charges of defrauding the government of tax 
revenues³⁶.  In 2013, UBS was fined €10 million (£8.5 million) by the French 
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authorities for helping wealthy clients to open undeclared bank accounts in 
Switzerland and avoid taxes in France³⁷. 
 RBS had stashed some £25 billion of its cash in tax havens, which could have 
deprived the UK of £500 million of tax revenues³⁸. The bank has been accused 
of engaging in complex transactions to avoid tax on profits of £3.8 billion from 
the sale of various bonds³⁹. In January 2014, a number of former RBS bankers 
were arrested and charged with using a film-production scheme to avoid £2.5 
million in taxes⁴⁰. 
 Barclays Bank has been under public scrutiny because of the mismatch 
between its profits and taxes. For the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, Barclays 
reported pre-tax profits of £5.7 billion, £3.2 billion and £4.8 billion 
respectively. The headline corporation tax rates for these years were 28%, 
26% and 24% respectively. The bank actually paid UK taxes of £147 million in 
2010, £296 million in 2011 and £82 million in 2012⁴¹. One of the reasons for 
the mismatch between profits and tax is that Barclays had an internal division 
which was set targets to avoid taxes, and its staff were incentivised to meet 
those targets. This division generated revenues of more than £1 billion a year 
between 2007 and 2010. One of its roles was to craft tax avoidance schemes. 
In 2012, the UK government took the rather unusual step of introducing 
retrospective legislation to block two of its tax avoidance schemes, which 
could have enabled Barclays and/or its clients to avoid around £500 million of 
UK corporation tax⁴². HM Treasury’s press release referred to both schemes as 
“highly abusive” and “designed to work around legislation that has been 
introduced in the past to block similar attempts at tax avoidance”⁴³.   
 A 2013 US court judgment showed that Barclays collaborated with 
accountancy firm KPMG to market tax avoidance schemes to major 
corporations, including AIG, Microsoft, Intel and Prudential. After examining 
some 1,250 exhibits, the judge declared the scheme to be unlawful and said⁴⁴ 
that it is an “abusive tax avoidance scheme. …  The conduct of those persons 
from … Barclays, KPMG … who were involved in this and other transactions 
was nothing short of reprehensible”. 
It is hard to find any major bank that did not seek to fill its coffers through abusive 
practices. 
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Chapter 3: Derivatives - the 
elephant in the room 
Since the 1970s there has been an explosion in the trade in derivatives. Companies 
pretend that it is all about risk-management, but most of this trade consists of naked 
gambling, usually with other people’s monies. The gambling is akin to someone 
placing a bet on racehorses. Of course, the financial horses can’t and don’t always 
win. Derivatives have been described by investment guru Warren Buffett as "financial 
weapons of mass destruction"⁴⁵. Bankers bet on anything that can be priced – copper, 
wheat, cotton, corn, tin, gold, currencies and anything else. The hard cash needed to 
settle the outcome of these bets is always highly uncertain until the contracts mature, 
which could be 10 to 15 years in the future. The UK Treasury does not even hold any 
meaningful data about the exposure of UK banks⁴⁶, but the information released by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) shows that in June 2013 the global 
notional/face value of Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives was about $693 trillion⁴⁷. 
Over-the-Counter means that the securities are not traded on recognised exchange. 
They are bilateral contracts between financial institutions and other corporations. 
Each party relies on the other to perform its part of the contract. This means that the 
failure of one financial institution will have a knock-on effect on others. In addition, 
some derivatives are traded on recognised stock exchanges and may have a notional 
value of $70 trillion⁴⁸, making a total of $763 trillion (£477 trillion). Even now a lot of 
data is missing or incomplete and some think that the grand total could be $1200 
trillion (£750 trillion)⁴⁹. The actual economic exposure is unknown, but some 
estimates put it at around $20 trillion (£12.5 trillion). The global GDP is around $75 
trillion (£47 trillion), and it is unlikely that any government will be in a position to 
contain the impact of financial meltdown. 
The UK’s GDP is around £1.5 trillion. The entire UK household wealth at the end of 
2012 was estimated to be about £7.3 trillion⁵⁰. Against this background, just three UK 
banks – Barclays, HSBC and RBS alone – have a derivatives portfolio, with a face value 
totalling nearly £100 trillion. Barclays leads the way with £40.5 trillion, though the 
actual exposure is hard to judge. Its 2012 balance sheet showed derivative assets of 
£469 billion and derivatives liabilities of £462 billion. The assets and liabilities are not 
necessarily directly offset as the direction of exposure cannot be guaranteed. So the 
exposure could be over £900 billion, some 60% of the UK GDP. The total capital of the 
worldwide operations of Barclays Bank is only £63 billion. The total global capital of 
HSBC, the UK’s largest bank, is $183 billion (£114 billion). Its 2012 balance sheet 
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shows derivatives assets of $357 billion (£223 billion) and derivatives liabilities of 
$359 billion (£224 billion). So, depending on events, the exposure could be over 
$700 billion (£447 billion). Derivatives were behind the demise of Barings, Lehman 
Brothers, Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, MF Global, Countrywide, Merrill Lynch, 
Wachovia and Washington Mutual, just to mention a few. Société Générale trader 
Jerome Kerviel was considered to be one of the best risk managers in the world, but 
his bets on stock index futures went sour and caused the bank to report a loss of 
€4.9 billion (£4 billion) in 2008⁵¹. This dwarfed the $6 billion (£3.75 billion)⁵² loss on 
natural gas futures by Amarnath Advisors in 2006, and Sumitomo copper futures loss 
of $2.6 billion (£1.6 billion)⁵³ in 1996.   
Even Nobel Prize winners in economics have been unable to manage derivatives. In 
1997, US economists Myron Scholes and Robert Merton shared the Nobel Prize in 
Economics “for a new method to determine the value of derivatives”. Their 
mathematical models enabled them to make huge profits through Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), a hedge fund⁵⁴. However, just seven months after receiving 
their Nobel Prize, their models were in trouble. At one stage, LTCM had capital of 
only $4.72 billion, but borrowed $124.5 billion and thus tied numerous other banks 
to its risky positions. In 1997-98, LTCM misjudged the severity of the East Asian and 
Russian financial crisis and found itself with $400 million of capital, $100 billion of 
debts, $4.5 billion of losses and derivatives with a face value of $1 trillion. The US 
government persuaded a consortium of banks to rescue it. 
This massive gambling produces little, if any, additional real wealth, but its 
destructive effects have continued. In 2007, Northern Rock had derivatives with a 
face value of £125 billion. It had opaque corporate structures and held some $50 
billion of debt in Granite Master Issuer Inc., a specially created entity in the tax 
haven of Jersey, supposedly a charitable trust. Granite had hardly any employees, 
but was used by Northern Rock to sell bundles of its mortgages and obfuscate its 
financial risks. In 2008, Lehman Brothers collapsed with 1.2 million derivatives 
contracts which had a face value of nearly $39 trillion (£24.4 trillion), though the 
economic exposure was considerably less. Its balance sheet boasted net derivatives 
assets of $22.2 billion (£14 billion), which turned out be equivalent to the bookies 
receipts. As the financial horses did not reach the winning post, all of this became 
worthless junk and it faced claims from counter parties for payment of $300 billion 
(£188 billion). For nearly six years before its demise, almost all of the pre-tax profits 
at Bear Stearns came from speculative activities. It could not continue to pick 
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winners indefinitely and collapsed in 2008. It had shareholder funds of $11.8 billion 
(£7.4 billion), debts of $384 billion (£240 billion) and a derivatives portfolio with a 
face value of $13.4 trillion (£8.4 trillion). In October 2011, MF Global, the US 
brokerage firm which specialised in delivering trading and hedging solutions, filed for 
bankruptcy. It had nearly three million derivatives contracts with a notional value of 
over $100 billion (£63 billion). 
This reckless gambling has serious consequences for the average household. In 2012, 
Goldman Sachs (a bank bailed out by the US taxpayers) made an estimated $400 
million (£251 million) from speculating on the price of essential foods, such as 
wheat, maize, coffee and sugar⁵⁵. The World Bank estimated that in 2010, 44 million 
people were pushed into poverty because of high food prices. In one day in 2010, JP 
Morgan bought up between “50% and 80%” of the world reserve of 350,000 tons of 
copper⁵⁶. The bank was not interested in mining, processing, using copper, taking its 
delivery or selling it. Its interest was simply to speculate, create frenzy and make a 
quick profit, which it did.  
Despite all the evidence, the finance industry remains addicted to derivatives, and 
regulators have shown little urgency in curtailing that addiction. The Senior 
Supervisors Group, which includes the UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority, has said 
that “Five years after the financial crisis, firms’ progress towards consistent, timely, 
and accurate reporting of top counterparty exposures fails to meet both supervisory 
expectations and industry self-identified best practices”⁵⁷. So some six years after the 
crash, bankers are still gambling other people’s monies, governments don’t have the 
data to estimate, far less control, the risks; and regulators are operating blindly, 
leading us to the next crash. 
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Chapter 4: Business as usual 
for the banking sector  
Contrary to neoliberal claims, the state has not been rolled-back. Instead it has been 
restructured. It is not so concerned about the redistribution of income and wealth, 
labour rights, or the provision of decent healthcare, education, pensions and social 
infrastructure. In keeping with neoliberal ideology, the state has shunned pluralist 
policymaking apparatuses. Instead, corporate elites have been elevated to public 
policymaking bodies and the state’s major purpose is now to guarantee corporate 
profits. The state has become the underwriter of the financial sector. It has bailed 
out banks and shielded them from public scrutiny (see the reference to BCCI in 
Chapter 2). The word ‘nationalisation’ has not been mentioned, but the effects on 
the public purse are the same. The state, rather than the market, has committed 
loans and guarantees of £977 billion⁵⁸ to support distressed banks. The government 
is paying some £5 billion a year in interest alone, about the cost of building 500 new 
schools, on the borrowing raised to finance the purchase of shares and loans to 
banks⁵⁹.  
Under its quantitative easing programme, printing money as old-fashioned 
economists used to call it, the Bank of England has given £375 billion⁶⁰, about 
£16,000 per household to the banks. This money has not been used to provide loans 
to small and medium-sized businesses to enable them to reinvigorate the economy. 
Most of it has been used to reduce toxic assets and bolster bank balance sheets. 
Confidence in the banking sector is maintained through the provision of a taxpayer 
funded depositor protection scheme which safeguards savings of individuals of up to 
£85,000. Since March 2009, the state has maintained interest rates at 0.5%, 
considerably below the rate of inflation. This has robbed pensioners and savers of 
income and also eroded the real value of savings. The policy has enabled banks to 
borrow at ultra-cheap rates, lend money at high rates, make profits and replenish 
their balance sheets. The customer base for banks has swelled as the government 
has persuaded pensioners and social security claimants to receive their payments 
through bank accounts rather than through the Post Office.  
The state has guaranteed profits to the finance industry in numerous other ways, 
too. A good example of this is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), launched by the 
Tories in the early 1990s, and expanded by the Labour government from 1997 to 
2010. Under the PFI schemes, private corporations, with support from banks, 
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provide schools, hospitals, roads, solar energy, waste and defence equipment. These 
are effectively leased to the government who guarantees profits for banks and 
corporations though annual payments. In 2012, some 717 PFI contracts with a capital 
value of £54.7 billion were running. In return, despite record low interest rates, the 
government is committed to repaying £301 billion⁶¹. That is a profit of £247 billion for 
banks and corporations over the next 25-30 years. For example, RBS is the beneficiary 
of a £6 billion project to supply search and rescue helicopters to the government⁶². 
HICL Infrastructure is a fund established by HSBC and registered in Guernsey. Its 
portfolio of PFI projects includes Portsmouth Hospital and the John Radcliffe Hospital 
in Oxford. For 2011, it is estimated to have made a profit of £38 million from 33 PFI 
schemes, but paid only £100,000 in UK tax⁶³, equivalent to about 0.25%. 
The above are not the only examples of the way neoliberals have mobilised the state 
to maximise private profits. For example, the state has created pseudo-markets for 
corporations to exploit in land, gas, electricity, water, transport, healthcare, 
education, prisons, security and even pollution. Through their capture of the state, 
neoliberals have diluted, if not eliminated, the risk of business bankruptcy in the 
financial sector. They can gamble with other people’s savings and pensions. If their 
gambles pay-off, they collect large pay packets. If they don’t, then the state bails them 
out and ordinary people lose the value of their savings. There is no personal 
responsibility, liability or any other consequence. No market has ever penalised 
directors for such predatory practices. On the contrary, they are rewarded with high 
remuneration packages. 
 For the four years to 2012-13, the average pay of FTSE 100 directors rose by 
13.6% to £1.45 million, which is about three times the increase in average 
earnings for the same period⁶⁴.  
 The post-crash City bonus pool is expected to top £80 billion⁶⁵.  
 For 2012, the average remuneration of a chief executive at 15 leading US and 
European banks was $11.5 million (£7.19 million)⁶⁶.  
 HSBC’s chief executive received a remuneration package of £7.4 million whilst 
many front line staff in branches earned around £14,000 a year.  
 The CEO of Lloyds Banking Group received £3.8 million in 2012.  
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 At RBS, eight senior executives collected £21 million; in fact, 95 collected more 
than £1 million each⁶⁷.  
 More than 3,500 EU bankers were paid more than €1 million in 2013, of which 
75 percent are based in the UK⁶⁸. 
 At Goldman Sachs, 115 senior staff in London received an average pay packet 
of £2.7 million in 2012, a 50% rise.  
 At Barclays, 393 executives received an average of £1.3 million and for years, 
its former executive, Bob Diamond collected in excess of £20 million annually.  
 The beleaguered RBS paid an average of £701,000 to its 368 executives⁶⁹. 
 Despite all the fines for dubious practices, the chief executive of JP Morgan 
Chase collected a remuneration package of $20 million (£12.5 million) for 
2013⁷⁰.  
No executive or shareholder has offered their gains to innocent victims of their 
predatory practices. No shareholder has given the dividends from predatory 
practices to the victims. The state, most notably the US, has occasionally bitten back, 
but fines have just become another cost of doing business. They have been passed 
to customers in the form of higher charges for loans and overdrafts.  
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Chapter 5: Short-termism and  
maximising shareholder profits 
Some six years after the financial crash, there has been little fundamental reform of 
the financial sector. Financiers continue to gamble ordinary people’s savings and 
pensions. After examining the debacles at HBOS, the UK Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards concluded that “prudential supervisors cannot rely on financial 
markets to do their work for them. In the case of HBOS, neither shareholders nor 
ratings agencies exerted the effective pressure that might have acted as a constraint 
upon the flawed strategy of the bank”⁷¹. The interests of shareholders and society 
cannot be aligned as shareholders push directors to take even higher risks and 
extract as much cash as possible in the shortest possible time. The Commission on 
Banking Standards subsequently concluded that “shareholders failed to control risk-
taking in banks, and indeed were criticising some for excessive conservatism”⁷². 
Financial elites don’t want to hear any of this, and are engaged in a rear-guard action 
to protect their self-interested games. The main message of the Treasury reports by 
Sir David Walker⁷³ and Sir Winfried Bischoff⁷⁴ is to trust the markets, leave it to 
directors and voluntary and unenforceable corporate governance codes. Apparently, 
all that is needed is further empowerment of shareholders to shackle directors and 
rely on markets to put neoliberalism back on the yellow brick road, even though 
they have shown little interest in doing so.  
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Table 1 Shareholders’ Equity and Total Capital in UK Banks 
Notes: (1) Information as per audited balance sheets published by companies. (2) Lloyds Banking Group includes Lloyds 
Bank, Halifax Bank of Scotland, TSB, Scottish Widows and Birmingham Midshires. (3) Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
includes The Royal Bank of Scotland, National Westminster Bank, Ulster Bank, Citizens Financial Group, Charter One, 
Coutts Bank, RBS Securities, Isle of Man Bank, Dam and company, Churchill, Green Flag, Direct Line, Privilege and 
Lombard. (4) Santander is registered in Spain and has a presence in the UK. It has also absorbed some well-known UK 
names, such as Abbey National, Alliance and Leicester, and Bradford & Bingley. 
Company Year 
(1) Gross Assets 
(Million) 
(1) Shareholder  
Equity (Million)  
% Provided 
by Shareholders 
Barclays 2012 £1,490,321 £  62,957 4.22 
HSBC 2012 $2,692,538 $183,129 6.80 
(2) Lloyds Banking Group 2012 £   924,552 £  44,684 4.83 
(3) Royal Bank of Scotland 2012 £1,312,295 £  70,448 5.37 
(4) Santander  2012 €1,269,628 €  84,326 6.64 
Standard Chartered 2012 $   636,518 $  46,055 7.24 
Andy Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, has 
stated that the average duration of shareholdings in the US, UK and European banks 
“fell from around 3 years in 1998 to around 3 months in 2008. Banking became quite 
literally, quarterly capitalism”⁹⁴. The position of shareholders is no different from 
that of a trader or a speculator.  Shareholders provide a very small proportion of the 
risk capital of banks, as evidenced in Table 1. 
The proportion of capital provided by shareholders to major UK banks is, even by 
very generous standards of measurement, between 4.22% and 7.24% of their total 
assets. Most of the resources are provided by savers and other creditors, and 
bailouts have been funded by the public at large. Altogether, savers, borrowers and 
employees have a long-term interest in the operations of banks. However, there are 
no government proposals to empower these groups to direct banks and hold 
directors to account. Somewhat mutedly, the Banking Standards Commission has 
recommended that the Government consult on a proposal to amend section 172 of 
the Companies Act 2006⁹⁵ to remove shareholder primacy in respect of banks, 
requiring directors of banks to ensure the financial safety and soundness of the 
company ahead of the interests of its members⁹⁶. Needless to say, the government 
ignored such proposals in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 which 
does little to address the fundamental issues. 
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Chapter 6: Reform - for a 
banking sector that works in 
the public interest  
The neoliberal experiment has been a social disaster. The financial sector has been 
indulged through lax regulation and enforcement, and billions of pounds in bailouts, 
loans and subsidies. But it has delivered so little. In its boom years, between 2002 
and 2007, the financial sector paid £203 billion in UK corporation tax, national 
insurance, VAT, payroll taxes, stamp duty and insurance taxes⁷⁸. This is about half of 
that paid by the manufacturing sector. In the subsequent six years, the taxpayer has 
poured in nearly £1 trillion to rescue the financial sector through bailouts, loans, 
guaranties and subsidies. The cost to society is a deep recession, loss of jobs and 
GDP, destruction of people’s savings and a massive diversion of capital, which could 
have been used for more productive purposes. No society can afford a repeat of this 
economic bargain. Contrary to the neoliberal claims, the financial sector has hardly 
created any new jobs. Between 1991 and 2007, direct employment in the banking 
and financial services sector increased by only 35,370 to 1,054,084, or about 3.5% of 
the UK work force⁷⁹. Despite its poor social performance, the financial sector has 
extracted immense volumes of cash from the market. For the period 1998-2008, 
some 60% of the rise in income share of the top decile accrued to finance workers, 
mostly to relatively few executives and traders⁸⁰. So, the finance industry has 
exacerbated social inequalities. 
Neoliberalism has created perverse incentives for distortions in the financial sector 
where profits are privatised and losses are socialised. Organised gambling and anti-
social practices have undermined the stability of the entire economy. The financial 
sector has never been independent of the state, but has colonised the state in such a 
way that political power has been subordinated to corporate interests. Reforms 
need to be based on democracy and must rollback the worst aspects of 
neoliberalism. The following reforms will begin that work. 
1. Separate retail and speculative banking 
In contrast to the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, there must be a 
legally enforceable separation between retail and speculative banking. This 
would help to contain the toxic effects of future crises. However, merely 
separating the banking arms is not enough because speculators would 
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continue to be funded by monies from savers, pension funds and insurance 
companies to finance their gambling habits. By enjoying the benefit of limited 
liability, they will be able to dump their losses onto the rest of society and 
affect innocent bystanders. This should be addressed by withdrawing the 
privilege of limited liability from speculative activities, and holding the owners 
of entities personally liable for the debts of their organisations. The regulators 
would need to invigilate speculative banking to ensure that gambles are 
matched by available capital. 
2. Legislate for approval to be sought before investment banking 
can be financed with public funds 
To prevent innocent bystanders from being caught in the negative 
consequences of speculative activities, legislation should be enacted to ensure 
that no retail bank, insurance company or pension fund is able to provide any 
finance to investment banking without express approval from those directly 
affected. 
3. Restrict access to public courts 
Speculative banking should be denied access to publicly funded courts. 
Speculative banking covers large amounts and many counterparties. The 
practices add little economic value, if any, but disputes amongst reckless risk-
takers can last for years and would force taxpayers to bear the cost. This 
should be changed by legislation which makes certain financial contracts 
unenforceable through the courts. 
4. Introduce a financial transactions tax  
There should be a moderate financial transactions tax on certain financial 
transactions. This would help broaden the tax base and generate tax revenues 
to fund regulation of the financial sector to save it from its own follies. A 
progressive rate of tax can also discourage speculative flows to tax havens and 
secrecy jurisdictions which undermine much needed financial stability and tax 
revenues. 
5. Break the link between regulators and industry insiders 
For far too long, UK banking regulation has suffered from revolving doors 
whereby financial insiders become regulators and vice-versa. They have been 
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too close to the values, vocabularies and agendas of the industry and have 
failed to attach proper weight to the interests of other stakeholders. This 
vicious circle needs to be broken. The main priority of any regulator should be 
to protect the financial system and the individual consumer and this cannot be 
done unless there is some ideological distance between the industry and the 
regulator. The regulator needs to be advised by a Board of Stakeholders, 
representing a plurality of interests. This Board should not be dominated by 
the finance industry. In fact, only a minority shall come from the industry, thus 
ensuring that other voices are heard and policies are made by consensus. Its 
meetings would be held in the open and its minutes and working papers 
would be publicly available. 
6. Emphasise public interest over market pressures 
Retail banks should be freed from incessant pressures from stock markets for 
ever rising profits, a major cause of many banking scandals and the financial 
crash. Market pressures should be replaced by community pressures by 
turning them into co-operatives, mutuals, and employee- and state-owned 
enterprises. Retail banks should only be permitted to invest in securities 
specified by the regulators. These would primarily be low to medium risk 
securities. They should not be allowed to launch any financial product without 
express approval from the regulator. All evidence provided to secure such 
permission should be publicly available. 
7. Publicise remuneration contracts 
The executive remuneration contracts at all banks should be publically 
available. Employees, borrowers and lenders at all licensed banks should be 
empowered to elect directors and have a binding vote on all aspects of 
executive remuneration. Bank executives should receive a basic salary, subject 
to approval by stakeholders. Additional bonuses or incentives, if any, should 
require a binding vote from employees, borrowers and savers. The incentives 
should be linked to matters which emphasise long-term factors, such as 
freedom from scandals, service to the community, maintaining branch 
networks, consumer satisfaction, loans to small businesses, universal and fair 
access to finance, innovation and investment. The bonuses, if awarded, would 
be payable after five years and the agreements should contain clauses for 
claw-backs in the case of subsequent negative revelations. 
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8. Make banks a central part of the community 
Banks should be part of local communities. They should not be permitted to 
up sticks and leave local communities in the lurch. Maintaining a socially 
desirable network of branches should be a necessary quid pro quo for a 
deposit-taking licence and the state’s deposit protection guarantee. Each 
branch closure must be sanctioned by the regulator, and banks must be 
required to demonstrate that after closure, the local community’s access to 
banking services will not suffer.  
9. Ensure greater transparency 
Banks must not be permitted to obfuscate their accountability by hiding 
behind offshore operations or spurious special purpose vehicles. Each direct 
or indirect offshore excursion must be specifically approved by the regulator. 
Complete details must be provided and a report showing their assets, 
liabilities, profits, losses, capital, taxes and employees in each jurisdiction of 
their operations must be published. 
10.Make tax returns public in order to tackle tax avoidance 
Banks have been significant players in the tax avoidance industry and have 
also avoided taxes on their own profits. This should be checked by making 
their tax returns publicly available so that the people can scrutinise them and 
alert the understaffed tax authorities. This would empower stakeholders to 
ask searching questions at annual general meetings and enable them to 
decide whether a bank is ethical. Banks should be required to publish 
complete details of tax avoidance, for themselves or their clients, facilitated 
through their operations. 
11.End private auditing 
Almost all banks are audited by just four global accountancy firms. They enjoy 
the state guaranteed market of external auditing, but have always failed to 
highlight frauds, fiddles and risks. Despite queues outside Northern Rock and 
the demise of many banks, all distressed major banks received a clean bill of 
health from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG and Ernst & 
Young. This private police force of capitalism is primarily concerned about its 
own profits and uses auditing as a stall for selling other services, including tax 
avoidance. It has a history of silence and is immersed in too many conflicts of 
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interests, as evidenced by its silence at Barings, BCCI, the mid-1970s banking 
crash and other debacles. Accounting firms have shown no interest in serving 
the public or the state. The audits of all banks should be carried out on a real-
time basis directly by the regulator, or an agency specifically created for that 
purpose. This would enhance the regulator’s knowledge base and capacity for 
timely interventions. In the era of instant movement of money, ex-post audits 
are of little use. We have many types of audits, such as immigration checks at 
ports, checks on health and safety, fire safety and food hygiene, and they are 
all carried out by auditors who are neither hired nor remunerated by auditees. 
These auditors don’t use audit as a stall to sell consultancy, and their files are 
available to law enforcement agencies. Bank auditors should not be an 
exception to this. 
12.Ensure regular reviews of the banking industry 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee should hold an annual hearing 
into banking regulation to ensure that regulators are diligently and effectively 
performing their tasks. 
The above reforms are not a silver bullet, but will help to rollback the worst of 
neoliberalism. Parliamentary committees and influential commentators have drawn 
attention to the destructive effects of neoliberal ideology. Banks, like other major 
corporations, need to function as communities promoting and protecting the 
interests of ordinary people, rather than as private fiefdoms of self-interested 
executives and financial wheeler-dealers. The most effective reform is public 
sunlight, empowerment of community and democratic accountability, all of which 
have been lacking in the neoliberal era. The government needs to listen to the voices 
of the people who have seen the state become a bulwark of corporate interests, and 
address the democratic deficit. Ordinary people have borne the cost of predatory 
practices, but still have no say in how the financial industry is run. 
Albert Einstein is credited with saying that insanity is doing the same thing over and 
over again and expecting different results. So it is in the financial sector. Despite the 
banking crash, vast public debt, the decimation of people’s savings, loss of jobs and 
the never-ending tide of sleaze, the government still has faith in self-correcting 
markets, shareholders, credit rating agencies, dubious models of risk assessment, 
unrestrained gambling and banking elites functioning as regulators. There is an old 
adage that those who don’t learn from history are destined to repeat it. 
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